"David CL Francis" <[email protected]> wrote in message
news:[email protected]...
    > On Tue, 15 Mar 2005 at 12:59:51 in message
    > <[email protected]>, Mike
    > <[email protected]> wrote:
    > >Isn't it the A310 that also lost a tail and crashed in New York City a
    > >month or 2 after 9/11. IIRC, there is a particular airplane that the
    > >manufacturer says "don't use the rudder too hard" because if you do,
    > >the tail could break off. Imagine if you were test driving a car and
    > >the salesperson said "don't turn too hard or the car will break in
    > >half".
    > When this subject is discussed it seems to me some very important points
    > are often omitted, that is does the airframe meet the design cases?
    > Surely there are design requirements for aircraft which are researched
    > and defined by the aviation authority?
    > So did the airframe meet design requirements for gust loading, yaw
    > deflections and angles, control movements, negative and positive 'g'
    > etc? If it did not, then why not? Are the design requirements wrong or
    > did the airframe fail to meet them? Another factor is to what extent are
    > safeguards against excessively loads built in to airliners and to their
    > requirements?
    > --
    > David CL Francis
IRC the rudder went stop to stop several times in ~ 10 seconds. IMHO a
question which was not adequately addressed by the investigation was why the
rudder went stop to stop not once but several times. The rudder travel is
supposed to be limited at the speed the A/C was moving at the time the
rudder went stop to stop several times.
Ralph Nesbitt
Professional FD/CFR/ARFF Type
Posting From ADA

"David CL Francis" <[email protected]> wrote in message
news:[email protected]...
    > On Tue, 15 Mar 2005 at 12:59:51 in message
    > <[email protected]>, Mike
    > <[email protected]> wrote:
    > >Isn't it the A310 that also lost a tail and crashed in New York City a
    > >month or 2 after 9/11. IIRC, there is a particular airplane that the
    > >manufacturer says "don't use the rudder too hard" because if you do,
    > >the tail could break off. Imagine if you were test driving a car and
    > >the salesperson said "don't turn too hard or the car will break in
    > >half".
    > When this subject is discussed it seems to me some very important points
    > are often omitted, that is does the airframe meet the design cases?
    > Surely there are design requirements for aircraft which are researched
    > and defined by the aviation authority?
    > So did the airframe meet design requirements for gust loading, yaw
    > deflections and angles, control movements, negative and positive 'g'
    > etc? If it did not, then why not? Are the design requirements wrong or
    > did the airframe fail to meet them? Another factor is to what extent are
    > safeguards against excessively loads built in to airliners and to their
    > requirements?

The certification standards only address the stresses from one full rudder
deflection event, because the designers couldn't imagine a pilot doing more
than one full deflection. The 587 rudder went over about 5 times, IIRC, and
the entire tailfin broke off.

The Air Transat rudder loss probably didn't result from any pilot inputs and
only involved the rudder, as far as I know, so that's a different case.

On Tue, 15 Mar 2005 14:56:12 -0000, "Keith W"
<[email protected]> wrote:

    >"Dave Butler" <[email protected]> wrote in message
    >news:1110897377.464227@sj-nntpcache-5...
    >> Mike wrote:
    >>> Isn't it the A310 that also lost a tail and crashed in New York City a
    >>> month or 2 after 9/11. IIRC, there is a particular airplane that the
    >>> manufacturer says "don't use the rudder too hard" because if you do,
    >>> the tail could break off. Imagine if you were test driving a car and
    >>> the salesperson said "don't turn too hard or the car will break in
    >>> half".
    >> Doesn't your airplane have any structural limitations? Just offhand, I can
    >> think of max gear extension speed and never exceed speed as a couple of
    >> limitations on mine. Unless you have a full authority fly-by-wire computer
    >> limiting what you can do, you can break an airplane if you maneuver it
    >> outside its design limitations.
    >It was an airbus A-300 that crashed and since that isnt a
    >FBW aircraft the pilot had full control authority. The NTSB
    >report cited pilot error in applying excessive rudder for
    >the aircraft speed
    >Oh and many cars will respond very badly to excessive
    >steering inputs. SUV rollovers are a major source
    >of fatal accidents, thats why they put warning stickers
    >in rental company SUV's
    >Keith
There is a bit of a difference between the SUV and airplane exapmles.
For the SUV, the steering inputs result in a loss of control which
results in a crash. For the airplane example, it is the control
inputs that cause the damage, and the crash is a result of the
damage.

David,

    > So did the airframe meet design requirements for gust loading, yaw
    > deflections and angles, control movements, negative and positive 'g'
    > etc?

Yes.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

Hmm, why...
A great glide ratio - OK. But.
They have just one attempt only. If failed...
The precise calculation, correction maneuvers - I know.
But if mistaken there is no go around.
Considering terrain outside the strip...
Still impressed.

BTW, was that plane written off?
Roman
P.S. Actually, I am the glider sport pilot so I know quite well what it
is about to land without engines :-)
IMHO a jet plane with 300+ passengers aboard hardly be compared to a glider.

Robert M. Gary wrote:
    > I"m not sure why its such a surprise. The A330 has a great glide ratio.
    > The pilots had lots of good tools (speed brakes etc) to place their
    > landing. As I recall, they almost ended up being too high.
    >
    > -Robert, CFI (Certified Flight Instructor)

John Mazor wrote:
    > The Air Transat rudder loss probably didn't result from any pilot inputs and
    > only involved the rudder, as far as I know, so that's a different case.


Maybe the co-pilot made a really go joke and the captain laughed so hard
that he accidentally extended one leg to the max, deflecting the rufdder
to the maximum while at cruise speed, causing rudder to break off ?

Would the FDR have data to gauge any sideways acceleration (however
momentary it might have been) indicating the the rudder did move in one
direction before breaking off ?

Could a fault in the hydrolics cause the rudder to deflect to max
position on one side at high speed ? If this were to happen, and the
pilot didn'T have his feet on the rudder pedals, if it fair to state the
the pilot woudln't have any feedback that this happened ?

On Thu, 17 Mar 2005 12:48:54 -0500, nobody <[email protected]> wrote:


    >Could a fault in the hydrolics cause the rudder to deflect to max
    >position on one side at high speed ? If this were to happen, and the
    >pilot didn'T have his feet on the rudder pedals, if it fair to state the
    >the pilot woudln't have any feedback that this happened ?

There was a good (non-sensational) TV documentary about this incident.
It claimed that the a/c hit turbulence from a previous departure and
did, indeed, try to control the situation by several consecutive
opposite full rudder deflections. The controversy was that at the time
this was fine according to the operator, who tried to blame Airbus
because of what happened.

As part of the investigation someone did the sums to see what forces
would be present in such circumstances and, guess what, it turned out
that it would break not only a modern composite rudder but also a
conventional metal one.

"Bonzo" <[email protected]> wrote in message
news:[email protected]...
    > On Thu, 17 Mar 2005 12:48:54 -0500, nobody <[email protected]> wrote:
    > >
    > >Could a fault in the hydrolics cause the rudder to deflect to max
    > >position on one side at high speed ? If this were to happen, and the
    > >pilot didn'T have his feet on the rudder pedals, if it fair to state the
    > >the pilot woudln't have any feedback that this happened ?
    > There was a good (non-sensational) TV documentary about this incident.
    > It claimed that the a/c hit turbulence from a previous departure and
    > did, indeed, try to control the situation by several consecutive
    > opposite full rudder deflections. The controversy was that at the time
    > this was fine according to the operator, who tried to blame Airbus
    > because of what happened.
    > As part of the investigation someone did the sums to see what forces
    > would be present in such circumstances and, guess what, it turned out
    > that it would break not only a modern composite rudder but also a
    > conventional metal one.
Questions/Food for thought. With the autopilot engaged the autopilot would
attempt to correct changes in heading resulting from turbulence encounters.
The pilot would have nothing to do with this.

When rudder movements are recorded on the FDR is source of movement
recorded, i.e. whether movement was due input from pilot or autopilot?

Does manual use of the rudder disengage the auto pilot?

Does the rudder limiter react differently to inputs from pilot & autopilot?
If so is there any difference at differing speeds?
Ralph Nesbitt
Professional FD/CFR/ARFF Type
Posting From ADA

On Wed, 16 Mar 2005 at 15:26:41 in message
<1111004784.a9019d27a110ae4ad1846a4d754f6247@teran ews>, nobody
<[email protected]> wrote:
    >Obviously, the pilots would have received instruction on engine-out
    >operations, and the Transat pilots knew the high speed range for landing
    >gear, knew the low speed limiot for the RAT, knoew what systems worked
    >what didn't, knew that brakes would have a limited number of
    >applications, which is why after the second landing, he applied the
    >brakes big time because he freared that he would no longer had a 3rd
    >change (and the investigators found the pilot acted properly, even if it
    >meant that the tires/wheels/runway would be damaged).

What do you mean by 'after the second landing'? My information is that
only one landing took place and the nose wheel collapsed during braking.
The green light had not come on for the nose leg after using the
emergency system to drop the wheels.

Ref: 'Emergency: Crisis on the Flight Deck' by Stanley Stewart
--
David CL Francis

"David CL Francis" <[email protected]> wrote in message
news:[email protected]...
    > On Wed, 16 Mar 2005 at 15:26:41 in message
    > <1111004784.a9019d27a110ae4ad1846a4d754f6247@teran ews>, nobody
    > <[email protected]> wrote:
    > >Obviously, the pilots would have received instruction on engine-out
    > >operations, and the Transat pilots knew the high speed range for landing
    > >gear, knew the low speed limiot for the RAT, knoew what systems worked
    > >what didn't, knew that brakes would have a limited number of
    > >applications, which is why after the second landing, he applied the
    > >brakes big time because he freared that he would no longer had a 3rd
    > >change (and the investigators found the pilot acted properly, even if it
    > >meant that the tires/wheels/runway would be damaged).
    > What do you mean by 'after the second landing'? My information is that
    > only one landing took place and the nose wheel collapsed during braking.
    > The green light had not come on for the nose leg after using the
    > emergency system to drop the wheels.
    > Ref: 'Emergency: Crisis on the Flight Deck' by Stanley Stewart
    > --
    > David CL Francis
IRC the A/C bounced after the first touch down, touching down some > 2,000'
down the Ry after the bounce per the final report.
Ralph Nesbitt
Professional FD/CFR/ARFF Type
Posting From ADA

nobody <[email protected]>
sednews:1111004784.a9019d27a110ae4ad1846a4d754f624 7@teranews:

    > [email protected] wrote:
    >>
    >> The training might not include the 767, but the Gimli Glider's captain
    >> execute many similiar manouvers with his Cessna (or something like
    >> that), that's why he managed to land the 767 quite safely.
    >
    > Both the Gimli and the Transat reports make mention that the pilots
    > didn't have formal training on gliding that particular aircraft, but
    > that experience outside of their commercial pilots training cam in
    > handy. (the Gimli pilot had flow gliders).
    >
    > Obviously, the pilots would have received instruction on engine-out
    > operations, and the Transat pilots knew the high speed range for landing
    > gear, knew the low speed limiot for the RAT,


The high speed range for the landing gear is irrelevant in that situation.
All that's going to happen is you'll lose some gear doors. Who cares?
As for the RAT, it's good down to 90 knots. I'f you're below that, you're
not flying anyway!



knoew what systems worked
    > what didn't, knew that brakes would have a limited number of
    > applications, which is why after the second landing, he applied the
    > brakes big time because he freared that he would no longer had a 3rd
    > change (and the investigators found the pilot acted properly, even if it
    > meant that the tires/wheels/runway would be damaged).
    >
    > But receiving instruction != training in simulator for such situation.

We do, and have done for years.



Bertie
    >

David CL Francis <[email protected]>
sednews:[email protected]:

    > On Tue, 15 Mar 2005 at 12:59:51 in message
    > <[email protected]>, Mike
    > <[email protected]> wrote:
    >
    >>Isn't it the A310 that also lost a tail and crashed in New York City a
    >>month or 2 after 9/11. IIRC, there is a particular airplane that the
    >>manufacturer says "don't use the rudder too hard" because if you do,
    >>the tail could break off. Imagine if you were test driving a car and
    >>the salesperson said "don't turn too hard or the car will break in
    >>half".
    >
    > When this subject is discussed it seems to me some very important points
    > are often omitted, that is does the airframe meet the design cases?
    > Surely there are design requirements for aircraft which are researched
    > and defined by the aviation authority?
    >
    > So did the airframe meet design requirements for gust loading, yaw
    > deflections and angles, control movements, negative and positive 'g'
    > etc?

It did. It was certified, for chrissake.


Bertie

On Thu, 17 Mar 2005 at 03:47:12 in message
<[email protected] >, Ralph Nesbitt
<[email protected]> wrote:
    >> So did the airframe meet design requirements for gust loading, yaw
    >> deflections and angles, control movements, negative and positive 'g'
    >> etc? If it did not, then why not? Are the design requirements wrong or
    >> did the airframe fail to meet them? Another factor is to what extent are
    >> safeguards against excessively loads built in to airliners and to their
    >> requirements?
    >> --
    >> David CL Francis
    >IRC the rudder went stop to stop several times in ~ 10 seconds. IMHO a
    >question which was not adequately addressed by the investigation was why the
    >rudder went stop to stop not once but several times. The rudder travel is
    >supposed to be limited at the speed the A/C was moving at the time the
    >rudder went stop to stop several times.

So that was more than enough to develop a pilot induced oscillation that
could easily drive the aircraft beyond its yaw limits. Time your
reversals so that they do the opposite of a yaw damper and you could
well go beyond any normal load case.

I was also told that the yaw damper was not switched on even though it
is a check list item?
--
David CL Francis

David CL Francis <[email protected]>
sednews:[email protected]:

    > On Thu, 17 Mar 2005 at 03:47:12 in message
    > <[email protected] >, Ralph Nesbitt
    > <[email protected]> wrote:
    >>> So did the airframe meet design requirements for gust loading, yaw
    >>> deflections and angles, control movements, negative and positive 'g'
    >>> etc? If it did not, then why not? Are the design requirements wrong
    >>> or did the airframe fail to meet them? Another factor is to what
    >>> extent are safeguards against excessively loads built in to
    >>> airliners and to their requirements?
    >>> --
    >>> David CL Francis
    >>IRC the rudder went stop to stop several times in ~ 10 seconds. IMHO a
    >>question which was not adequately addressed by the investigation was
    >>why the rudder went stop to stop not once but several times. The
    >>rudder travel is supposed to be limited at the speed the A/C was
    >>moving at the time the rudder went stop to stop several times.
    >
    > So that was more than enough to develop a pilot induced oscillation
    > that could easily drive the aircraft beyond its yaw limits. Time your
    > reversals so that they do the opposite of a yaw damper and you could
    > well go beyond any normal load case.

the yaw damper only makes tiny inputs. Couple of degrees. IOW it had nothng
whatsoever todo with it.

    >
    > I was also told that the yaw damper was not switched on even though it
    > is a check list item?

Bullshit, and evenit it wasn't switched on it would have had nothing to do
with, well, anything. Low altitude, it's strictly for comfort, and igh
altitude it prevents reversal problems asociatied mach compications brought
on by dutch roll.


Bertie

On Sat, 19 Mar 2005 at 04:28:19 in message
<[email protected] >, Ralph Nesbitt
<[email protected]> wrote:
    >> What do you mean by 'after the second landing'? My information is that
    >> only one landing took place and the nose wheel collapsed during braking.
    >> The green light had not come on for the nose leg after using the
    >> emergency system to drop the wheels.
    >> Ref: 'Emergency: Crisis on the Flight Deck' by Stanley Stewart
    >> --
    >> David CL Francis
    >IRC the A/C bounced after the first touch down, touching down some > 2,000'
    >down the Ry after the bounce per the final report.

No mention of that in Stanley Stewart's book; I quote:

"Pearson touched down perfectly within 800ft of the threshold at about
175 knots but as he did so the two pilots saw to their horror that
people and vehicles milled about at the far end of the runway. Children
were playing and cycling in the area. Beyond the activity there were
tents and caravans in which the racing drivers and their families were
staying for the week end. The 767 sped towards the gathering with no
reverse power or ground spoilers available to help slow the machine. In
one camper vehicle parked near the runway a racer's wife, Jo Ann Barry,
was washing dishes after their evening meal when she heard a boy shout
that a jet was landing.

'I opened the camper door and there was this huge plane coming at us.'

Pearson hit the brakes hard and the aircraft reduced speed, but as it
did so the unlocked nose wheel collapsed. The nose dropped to the ground
and the nose wheel was forced back into the housing. Showers of sparks
were thrown into the air as the nose section scarped along the ground.
As it turned out, the fallen nose gear was a blessing in disguise for
the friction slowed the aircraft rapidly and the 767 shuddered to a halt
well short of the race meeting."

If you have a better source of information let me know - I have a
number of books on airliner accidents and am always interested to hear
of more.
--
David CL Francis