John Q. Public

Although "TOP SECRET" appears throughout, it is strikethrough in the
original document; meaning it is "declassified" and released to the
public domain. Nothing has been modified between the <<SNIPP>>s.


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VII. The Hijackers’ Visas
The Joint Inquiry reviewed passport and visa histories of the nineteen
hijackers involved
in the September 11 attacks to determine whether they entered the United
States legally. It also
sought to determine whether there were anomalies in the visa process
that might have alerted
U.S. Government officials to the hijackers in some way.
Over ten million applications for visas to enter the United States are
received each year at
approximately two hundred fifty consular locations. Consular officers at
posts abroad review all
applications and interview selected applicants to determine whether they
are likely to return to
countries of origin in accordance with the visa or are suspected of
criminal or terrorist activities.
Consular officers must certify in writing that they have checked
applicant names against the
State Department’s watchlist.
Although there were anomalies and mistakes on some of the hijackers’
visa applications,
consular-affairs experts at the State Department contended in Joint
Inquiry interviews that these
errors were “routine.� By contrast, an October 2002 review by the
General Accounting Office
(GAO) concluded that the omissions and inconsistencies in the hijacker’s
applications should
have raised concerns about why they wanted visas to come to the United
States.
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Fifteen of the 19 hijackers were Saudi nationals who received visas in
Saudi Arabia.
Before September 11, the United States had not established heightened
screening for illegal
immigration or terrorism by visitors from Saudi Arabia. In a Joint
Inquiry hearing, DCI Tenet
described a less than rigorous review of visa applicants in Saudi Arabia
before September 11:
Most of the young Saudis [hijackers] obtained their U.S. visas in the
fall of 2000.
The State Department did not have a policy to stringently examine Saudis
seeking
visas [page 197] before 11 September because there was virtually no risk
that
Saudis would attempt to reside or work illegally in the U.S. after their
visas
expired. U.S. Embassy and consular officials do cursory searches on
Saudis who
apply for visas, but if they do not appear on criminal or terrorist
watchlists they
are granted a visa. Thousands of Saudis every year are granted visas, as
a routine;
the majority are not even interviewed. The vast majority of Saudis study,
vacation, or do business in the U.S. and return to the kingdom.
Consistent with this description of the situation, the Joint Inquiry’s
review confirmed that, prior
to September 11, 2001, only a small percentage of visa applicants in
Saudi Arabia were
interviewed by consular affairs officers; travel agencies were used to
deliver visa applications to
consular offices in Saudi Arabia; and a relatively low standard was
applied in scrutinizing visa
applications for accuracy and completeness in Saudi Arabia.
The 19 hijackers received visas at consular offices abroad in accordance
with routine
procedures. The majority of the hijackers sought new passports shortly
before applying for
visas. Requests for new passports can stem from theft, loss, or
accidental destruction. However,
terrorists also often try to hide travel to countries that provide
terrorist training by acquiring new
passports.
Multiple-entry visas were issued to the hijackers for periods ranging
from two to ten
years. Eighteen of the nineteen received B-1/B-2 visas for tourist and
business purposes. The
nineteenth hijacker, Hani Hanjour, was issued a B-1/B-2 visa in error.
He should have been
issued an F-1 visa for study in the United States because he had
expressed a desire to study
English here. Recognizing the error, the INS issued Hanjour an F-1 visa
when he arrived in the
United States.
At their ports-of-entry, the hijackers were issued “stay visas� valid
for six months. Some
hijackers, Atta, Hanjour, al-Shehhi, al-Mihdhar, and Jarrah, entered and
re-entered the United
States for several six-month periods before September 11. They stayed
for five or six months,
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went abroad for weeks or months, re-entered the United States, and
received additional sixmonth
stays.
Since the majority of the hijackers were Saudi nationals who received
their visas in Saudi
Arabia, questions have been raised about the “Visa Express� program, a
process in many
countries that encourages visa applicants to submit non-immigrant
applications to designated
travel agencies or other collection points for forwarding to U.S.
embassies. In Joint Inquiry
interviews, State Department [page 198] officials described Visa Express
as simply an
application collection process and not a visa adjudication, issuance, or
determination system.
Visa Express is merely a way of “dropping the application off.� Travel
agencies assist by giving
applicants correct forms, helping non-English speakers fill out the
forms, and collecting fees.
Approximately sixty embassies and consulates throughout the world use
travel agencies or other
businesses in this manner.
The Visa Express program in Saudi Arabia began in May 2001. Five of the
19 hijackers
applied for visas in Saudi Arabia in June, so it is likely that they
used travel agencies to acquire
application forms and deliver them to the embassy. None of the five,
including al-Mihdhar, was
on a watchlist at the time. Thus, when name checks were performed, the
system showed no
derogatory information. If derogatory information did exist in the
system, as was the case with a
suspected terrorist who applied for a visa in Saudi Arabia in August
2001 under the Visa Express
program, the watchlist system should block issuance of a visa.
State Department officials informed the Joint Inquiry that the Visa
Express program was
terminated in Saudi Arabia in July 2002 because news reports suggested
that the program
allowed Saudi applicants to skirt the normal process. According to State
Department officials,
the program did not affect the number of Saudis interviewed because
applicants are selected for
interviews when their applications present signs of an intention to
immigrate. These officials
said that all applications, including those delivered to consular
officers under the Visa Express
program in Saudi Arabia, were checked against the watchlist.
The Joint Inquiry also received information from the Immigration and
Naturalization
Service about the 19 hijackers, two of whom, including Nawaf al-Hazmi,
had overstayed their
visas. In addition, Hani Hanjour had been issued an F-1 visa to study
English, but did not
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register for classes and, therefore, became “a non-immigrant status
violator.� The INS was not
aware of these violations until after September 11.
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