scrubbedexpat091

When your a countries largest exporter by dollar value things will always be political, right or wrong just how the world we live in works. Seems pretty much everything is political these days though.

If the MAX was grounded permanently, I don't see it killing the company completely, may end its commercial aircraft division, but as a company I would expect them to survive, although go Chapter 11 and reorganize.

Seattle and Washington state might go into recession though Boeing has something like 80,000 employees in the region.

scrubbedexpat091

Boeing did a test flight today, they took the CEO with them.

They will do additional test flights before submitting the software update for approval.

https://globalnews.ca/news/5128277/b...pxNbqI0rGocdMY

caretaker

My cousin took me on a tour around Seattle on his motorcycle back around 1970 and we went by the Boeing factory - it's still the largest building in the world. A sister who worked for Chrysler said their Jeep-Eagle plant in Brampton was the biggest factory she'd ever been in, and it doesn't hold a candle to Boeing.

scrubbedexpat091

Boeing tour and the museum are on my wish list of things to do.

scrubbedexpat091

The FAA has created a Joint Authorities Technical Review team to review the software Boeing is working on for the MAX, the team is chaired by former NTSB Chairman Christopher Hart and will also include members from NASA, the FAA, Canada and other countries willing to take part.

dave_j

Boeing has now conceded that MCAS contributed to the recent crash.
I believe that it will no longer be sufficient to simply rubber stamp the 'fix'. Questions surrounding how this aircraft acquired certification will inevitably require a complete and in depth examination of the entire flight control code. How much pressure Boeing will be able to apply to whoever's job it is to take on this poison chalice is open to question but I think that Boeing would be prudent to ensure that it is seen to be patient because such investigations take time, and time costs money, in this case quite a lot.
Imagine the fallout in terms of customer resistance to fly if a re-certified Max 8 fell from the skies.... for whatever reason.

MidAtlantic

Here is the best reporting I have found on the background to Boeing being in this mess: https://www.vox.com/2019/4/5/1829664...oftware-update

magnumpi

dave_j

I suspect that we'll witness how Boeing's future is perceived by the outside world if we keep and eye on the CEO's bonus and shows that a month is a long time in the aircraft business.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic...-for-last-year
To summarise the headline:
Boeing Co.’s CEO received $23.4 million last year for turbocharging growth and driving record performance, announced March 2019.
Dennis Muilenburg’s 2018 pay includes a $1.7 million salary and $13 million bonus, an increase of 27 percent from a year earlier.
I suspect that there will be those who'll want not only his bonus back but his head to go with it. This man will have overseen the decision not to have engineered a new competitor for the A320 NEO and to have signed off on MCAS, the fix intended to manage the unusual flight characteristics of a cheap lash-up intended to save Boeing money and help fund this CEO's bonus.
News that Boeing has reduced production by 20% begs the question of what Boeing will do with those already made since few in the world at large will want to bite the bullet and state that this aircraft is safe to fly. But every man has his price and no doubt there will those willing to do just that, just promise them a bonus. They might even promise them free flights on the MAX but will they accept them?

dbd33

Isn't that inviting the question rather than begging it?

dave_j

As a design engineer it was put to me that items tended to be redesigned every seven years or so because that was the general turnover of specialist experience. This was important because you need a certain level of expertise in order to answer the question 'What if?' when assessing safety.
I draw your attention to the following article. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic...lure-data-show
What this places in the cross-hairs is the accusation that nobody at Boeing asked the question 'What if the angle of attack sensor fails?' when used as a single source of data for a safety critical piece of software where such sensors have a credible history of failure. In other words Boeing engineers were insufficiently experienced to understand the robustness of equipment they were basing their decisions on and weren't experienced enough to ask ALL the questions that needed to be asked to satisfy the safety of their designs.
It also highlights a management regime that allows such designs to pass through what should be a rigorous confirmation process before being signed off. It smacks of a hurried 'Let's get this fixed quick and don't ask questions' mentality that shouldn't exist in any design department.
What else lurks in those dark corners where the MAX designs have been laid to rest?

scrubbedexpat142

Can't post a link to this, yet...

scrubbedexpat142

Now I can

Article

calman014

I have worked on several commercial types, both from Boeing and Airbus.
Boeing used to have pretty solid safety procedures and almost every system onboard had a backup of some kind and in some cases 2, this is referred to as "Redundancy".

Admittedly that was before we had "glass cockpits" full of screens rather than the old analog dials for the various sensors and indicators needed to fly.
Only last week, a plane was forced to land due to complete cockpit display failure.

When Airbus released its first models, Boeing was the first to criticise, as Airbus depended heavily on computer aided flight. You may have seen some shots of airbuses pulling some pretty impressive manouvers at airshows for example, where the computer would override inputs from the pilot and not allow him or her to push the aircraft out of its safe flying envelope.

The 737 has been a mainstay of all airlines for many years, but to stretch a plane, hang extremely powerful engines on the wing which wasn't really designed for the type and then to expect software to compensate for the inherent instability is not a good strategy, nor is still trying to call it a 737 and use the historical safety record to try and push sales. As usual a frantic attempt to capture the market.
I think that this has been a massive blunder of Boeing and it will be interesting to see how this develops.

scrubbedexpat091

FAA to meet with Southwest, American, United company safety representatives along with pilots and union officials today regarding the Max.
2/3 of 737 MAX operators have experienced the fix in simulators.
The joint review board for the update, the FAA has set up now has representatives from China, Europe, Canada, Brazil, Indonesia, Ethiopia and others that are not named.
Southwest has updated its schedule to reflect no MAX aircraft until early August, where AA and UA have updated through early June

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/11/reut...g-737-max.html